How the South China Sea Situation Will Develop After the June 17 Clash?

On June 17, 2024, the Philippines sent 6 vessels, including 1 supply ship and 2 inflatable boats, to the waters of the Second Thomas Shoal, Spratly Islands, attempting to deliver supplies to the grounded ship Sierra Madre. Unlike previous resupply operations led by the Philippine Coast Guard, this one was directly commanded by AFP Western Command and led by the Philippine Marine Corps, marking an unprecedented escalation. In response, the China Coast Guard took lawful measures to intercept, inspection by boarding, and expel the Philippine vessels that intruded into Second Thomas Shoal waters, as well as confiscated weapons and other non-essential supplies. Multiple collisions occurred between vessels from both sides, leading to close confrontations far exceeding the intensity of previous standoffs, making it the most severe friction in the South China Sea in the past decade. This incident generated significant attention worldwide.

Scene of the June 17 Clash

Following this incident, many analysts at home and abroad expressed concerns, believing that escalation is inevitable and that military conflict might even break out. Some radical voices even have loudly clamored, "The US should do something. It's time to prove the US-Philippines alliance is rock solid."[1] But will the situation be beyond control?

Indeed, with this incident serving as a significant manifestation, friction between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea has already escalated. 

However, the overall situation in the South China Sea remains controllable, and it is unlikely to intensify into armed conflict in the short term.

On one hand, we cannot underestimate the Philippines' ambition in the South China Sea. From its inception, the current Philippine government had a plan to occupy and control the entire so-called "West Philippine Sea". Since 2023, the Philippines has comprehensively challenged China at various points including Second Thomas Shoal, Scarborough Shoal, Sandy Cay and Sabina Shoal, refusing to acknowledge any understanding or disputes with China. Currently, a large number of Philippine fishing boats continue to operate in the waters near Scarborough Shoal, and Philippine Coast Guard vessels continue to stay at Sabina Shoa. There are no signs that the Philippines will change its stance and policy. But on the other hand, we cannot overestimate the Philippines' capabilities. Whether in terms of operational capacity or determination, the Philippines is likely the weakest among the South China Sea parties , let alone to compete with China. Unless the US directly intervenes to help, the Philippines has a limit in its provocative actions in the region, and mostly poses a "grey zone" challenge with its space for major actions limited. Over the past year, the Philippines' methods and postures in provoking China have essentially been exhausted. In the future, there will be adjustments in location, pace, and intensity, but such provocations will generally be within expectations.

The US policy regarding this round of China-Philippines friction in the South China Sea is always clear. As was pointed out in the article from September 2023, the US would love to see daily incidents in the South China Sea rather than a major crisis.[2] Although it welcomes continuous friction between China and the Philippines, thereby increasing its strategic presence in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait while pressuring China, it is neither prepared nor determined to engage in a military showdown with China in the region nor willing to be the cat’s paw for the Philippines. Therefore, regarding each maritime friction between China and the Philippines, the US has fully worked on diplomacy and public opinion, garnering much attention via frequently condemning China, endorsing the Philippines, and repetitively threatening to invoke the Mutual Defense Treaty. But meanwhile, it has been extremely cautious in its military operations. Strengthening supports such as intelligence sharing and operational planning, it has still kept a distance from Philippine operations on the front stage. Being very clear about the Philippines' ambitions and China's red lines in the South China Sea, the US is aware that directly military supporting the former’s advocates would be tantamount to going to war with China. Nor does it wants to overly embolden the Philippines nor trigger a misjudgment by China. Recent sensational analyses at home and abroad that overstated China-Philippines friction as China-US competition undoubtedly oversimplified international relations and great power competition. The US does have a vast series of plans to compete with or even confront China and is making various preparations, but it is certainly not for the interests and agenda of the Philippines.

China is the anchor of peace and stability and an important variable that influences the situation in the South China Sea. In the past decades, China has consistently emphasized "shelving disputes" and resolving conflicts through negotiations among the concerned parties. China has reiterated publicly that “China has no intention of occupying Second Thomas Shoal, but only hopes that the feature can be restored to its natural state.”[3] While China's policy remains unchanged, what has evolved is its capability and resolve to safeguard sovereignty and maritime rights. In response to the Philippines' recent provocations, China made numerous sincere efforts to communicate and persuade the Philippines up until August 2023, but these efforts were largely ignored by the Philippine side. When communication proved ineffective, China had no choice but to take actions to uphold its red lines. Over the past year, China's overwhelming on-site presence, strong will to combat, and steadfast determination to defend its rights have directly hindered the Philippines' provocative actions in the South China Sea, dashing its ambitions in the so-called "West Philippine Sea" and delivering a heavy blow to the Philippines' arrogance. In fact, as China has strengthened its countermeasures, the profile of the Philippines regarding South China Sea frictions has been steadily lowering in spite of its verbal reluctance. Following the June 17 clash, on June 21, the Chairman of the Philippine National Maritime Council, Bersamin, remarked that the confrontation between Philippine military personnel and the China Coast Guard "might have been a misunderstanding or accident," adding, "We are not yet ready to classify this as an armed attack." President Marcos himself also stated, "The Philippines does not seek to escalate the situation."[4] This stands in stark contrast to early 2023 when Philippine high-ranking officials frequently declared their intent to establish Second Thomas Shoal as a permanent military outpost, retake Scarborough Shoal, and demand the withdrawal of all Chinese equipment and personnel from the so-called "West Philippine Sea." Regarding the so-called “laser incident" in February 2023, President Marcos summoned Chinese Ambassador Huang Xilian for a high-profile meeting and delivered a passionate speech. Largely due to China's countermeasures, the Philippines' tone on the South China Sea has noticeably softened although the situation in 2024 might be even more "heated".

Source: Daily Guardian

At the moment, for different reasons mentioned above, both Beijing and Washington have shown a very clear message that they want some stability, at least without direct armed conflict, in the South China Sea, Manila has outrageous ambitions, but lacks the necessary capabilities. Therefore, the situation will continue to maintain a certain degree of heat, but there is a high probability that it will not get out of control.

Reference

[1] Grant Newssham, US reputation on the line at Second Thomas Shoal, June 20,2024, https://asiatimes.com/2024/06/us-reputation-on-the-line-at-second-thomas...

“This Was No "Accident," June 23,2024, https://www.sealight.live/posts/this-was-no-accident.

[2]胡波：“仁爱礁局势：走向长期灰色地带对抗”，南海战略态势感知计划，2023年9月4日，http://www.scspi.org/zh/dtfx/1693821895.

[3]“外交部发言人就菲律宾外交部发表关于仁爱礁问题的声明答记者问”，外交部，2023年8月8日，https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/fyrbt_673021/dhdw_673027/202308/t20230807_11123....

[4]“China’s Latest Actions Not An Armed Attack,” June 22,2024, https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2024/06/22/2364700/chinas-latest-acti... not in business of instigating wars, says President Marcos, June 23, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/philippines-not-business-inst....